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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

~

SATISH S. LATHI,
Plaintiff,

v.
JAY T. CLARK, Individually, PATRICIA
L. CLARK, Individually, & SOUTHEAST
CAPITAL PARTNERS, INC.,
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs,

v.
JAY T. CLARK, Individually, PATRICIA
L. CLARK, Individually, & SOUTHEAST
CAPITAL PARTNERS, INC.,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs,

v.
SATHIS S. LATHI, SUBHASH LATHI, and
SUNTRUST MORTGAGE, INC.
Counterclaim Defendants.
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DEPUTY CLEFlK SUPERIOR COURT
FULTON COUNTY GA

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT
On March 26, 2008, counsel appeared before the Court to present oral argument on
the following motions: (1) Counterclaim Defendant Subhash Lathi Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment; (2) Plaintiff Satish Lathi's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; (3) the
Motion for Summary Judgment of Counterclaim Defendant SunTrust Mortgage Inc.; and (4)
Defendant Jay T. Clark's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. After having reviewed the
record of the case, the briefs filed in conjunction with these motions, and counsels'
arguments, the Court finds as follows:

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case involves a dispute between business partners in a real estate development

company over rights in and to the proceeds of certain development projects.
Beginning in 1998, Jay Clark ("Clark") and Satish Lathi ("Lathi") worked together
developing real estate projects. South East Capital Partners, LLC ("SECP"), owned 50/50 by
Clark and Lathi, was a development entity and expense vehicle for the parties' real estate
projects. Both Clark and Lathi were employees of SECP, which was in the business of
identifying new properties/projects and creating new development entities to facilitate a
project. In addition to SECP, Lathi was a 10% owner in SECP Investments, LLC ("SECP
Investments"), a company in which Clark and SECP were also owners. Some of the SECP
development sub-entities were created under SECP Investment and others were sub-entities
directly under SECP. At the time of the Assignment and Collateral Agreement (UACA"), under
SECP Investments had 6 sub-entities formed under its organization: Creekside, Northside,
Lake Spivey, Brentwood, Block Lofts, and Stratford. Imagining the business as a flow chart,
SECP is the first tier, SECP Investment along with other SECP sub-entities are the second
tier, and SECP Investments' sub-entities form the third tier. All of the sub-entities (whether
SECP or SECP Investments) were owned by some combination of SECP, Clark, Lathi and/or
a third party investor.
Lathi was significantly in debt to SECP, Clark, and Patricia Clark ("P. Clark"). Lathi
borrowed from her his initial buy-in into SECP. Thereafter, when SECP, through its
development entities, developed a new property, Lathi would invest in those projects with a
loan from Clark, P. Clark, or SECP. In addition, Lathi took salary draws or advances (Le.,
loans) against anticipated project profits. These loans, plus accrued interest at 12-18%,
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constituted Lathi's debt. Lathi consolidated/reorganized his debt twice: first, through a
second mortgage on his home from Chattahoochee National Sank ("CNS"), and second,
through the ACA.
In 2004, Lathi and Clark entered into the ACA, which was intended to govern the cash
flow between the parties, including: (1) loans to Lathi, (2) development proceeds to Clark
and Lathi, and (3) repayments by Lathi to SECP, Clark, or P. Clark. Specifically, the ACA (1)
outlined Lathi's current debt, (2) described the terms under which Lathi could acquire future
debt, (3) assigned to Clark and SECP an interest in Lathi's future development proceeds, (4)
established the "waterfall" structure governing proceeds distributions and repayment priorities
and percentages, and (5) established the terms under which P. Clark would assume the CNS
loan.
STANDARD

II.

A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to C.C.G.A. § 9-11-56
when the moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be tried and
that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, warrant
summary judgment as a matter of law.

Lau's Corp.! Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491

(1991). The moving party need only eliminate one essential element of a party's claim to
prevail on summary judgment.

Real Estate Int'I Inc. v. Suggah, 220 Ga. App. 449, 451

(1996).
III. ISSUES RELATING TO THE ACA
The parties seek summary judgment on three issues under the ACA: (1) the scope of
the "waterfall" structure, (2) the definition of "new" SECP Entities, and (3) the parties' rights
and obligations with respect to guaranty fees.
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Contract interpretation is a matter of law for the courts. First, the Court must decide if
the contract is clear or ambiguous. Where the language is clear, the contract shall be so
enforced. Where the language is ambiguous, however, the Court must turn to the rules of
contract construction, found at D.C.G.A. §§13-2 et seq. White v. Kaminsky, 271 Ga. App.
719 (2004). If, after application of the construction rules, the ambiguity remains, then a jury
shall decide the intent of the parties.

A.

Waterfall Projects

Lathi argues that Section 5 of the ACA, which establishes the waterfall, governs
proceeds distribution on all SECP projects (including the profitable Block Lofts). Clark, on
the other hand, argues that Section 5 only covers "New SECP Entities" (as defined in the
ACA) and the "Existing SECP Entities" specifically referenced in the section's final paragraph
(Lake Spivey, Northside, and Cavalier Creekside).
At the time that the parties entered into the ACA, SECP Investments had 6 sub-entities
with ongoing projects: three with an outside investor whose profits and losses were to be
aggregated (Block Lofts, Brentwood, Stratford, hereinafter, collectively, the "Disputed
Projects") and three additional projects (Lake Spivey, Northside, and Cavalier Creekside,
hereinafter, collectively, the "Included Projects"). The parties disagree as to how the
proceeds from these projects were to be distributed based upon the language at the end of
Section 5, which specifically addresses ownership interests and operating agreement
amendments to the Included Projects. Clark argues that the profits on the Disputed Projects
should be distributed according to Lathi's 10% ownership interest SECP Investments; on the
other hand, Lathi argues that he is entitled to a 50% share of the proceeds remaining after
the waterfall priority distributions.
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The scope of Section 5 in the ACA is ambiguous. Recital "A" of the ACA states that
"the entities listed on Schedule I attached hereto (such entities are listed on Schedule I are
referred to collectively as the "Existing SECP Entities") ... ". Schedule I, titled "Existing SECP
Entities" lists 15 entities, each formed in conjunction with SECP to develop a particular
project. Section 5, titled "Distribution Priority for New SECP Entities" states that "Lathi and
Clark hereby agree that distributions from any and all SECP Entities shall be governed by
the following terms ... " and that "[d]istributions from each SECP Entity shall be made in the
following order .... " (emphasis added). Section 5 goes on to describe the proceed priority
distributions schedule (the waterfall) and includes specific references to "Existing SECP
Entities".
Having found the language to be ambiguous, the Court now turns to the rules of
contract construction to interpret the provision. Such construction rules include the "cardinal"
construction rule of ascertaining the intent of the parties as well as interpreting the agreement
as a whole document. Hiers v. ChoicePoint Services, 270 Ga. App. 128 (2004); Snipes v.
Marcene P. Powell and Assoc., Inc., 273 Ga. App. 814 (2005). In addition, the Court may
consider how the parties acted under the contract and/or demonstrated their intent through
outside documents or negotiations in interpreting ambiguous contract language. See,
Transkey, Inc., v. Adkinson, 225 Ga. App. 457 (1997); Salvatori Corp. v. Rubin, 159 Ga. App.
369 (1981).
Clark argues that Section 5 specifically addresses and includes the proceeds from the
Included Projects. Clark argues that the specific inclusion of the Included Projects is
evidence of the parties' intent to exclude the Disputed Projects. See George L. Smith II
Georgia World Congress Center Authority v. Soft Comdex, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 461,464
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(2001) ("[U]nder the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," the list of "Facilities
Licensed" in the contract is presumed to exclude any facility not specifically listed.").
Additionally, Clark argues that Schedule I was only intended to list Lathi assets to be used to
secure Lathi's debts, not to list all projects applicable to the waterfall established in Section 5.
Finally, Clark directs the Court to the prior drafts of the ACA which show that (1) the
October 27th draft included only "New SECP Entities" within the waterfall, (2) the October
28th draft covered "Existing" and "New SECP Entities", but included language to address
profit/loss aggregation issues for the Disputed Projects, and (3) the October 30th draft deleted
the aggregation language and added language to the last paragraph to amend the operating
agreements of the Included Projects. Clark argues that the evolution of Section 5 comports
with his interpretation of the scope of the waterfall: that the Disputed Projects were excluded
from the waterfall.
Lathi argues that the ACA represents the parties' cash flow plans moving forward and
encompassed all proceeds explaining why the provision reads "any and all SECP Entities".
Lathi also argues that Schedule I defines the list of "Existing SECP Entities" and includes the
Disputed Projects. Therefore, Lathi argues, without a specific carve out excluding the
proceeds of the Disputed Projects, such proceeds should be distributed according to the
waterfall. Lathi counters Clark's argument that without naming the Disputed Projects in
Section 5, they were excluded because, Lathi argues, they were speCifically included in
Schedule I and the language of Section 5 ("any and all" and "each SECP Entity").
Finally, Lathi points to the parties' prior conduct to demonstrate their intent to include
the Disputed Projects in the waterfall. Lathi testified that in December 2005, he gave Clark a
draft distribution of Block Loft profits that followed the waterfall in Section 5. Clark made no
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objections to the draft distribution, and did not change the distribution schedule to reflect a
10% distribution, as he claims is required under his interpretation of Section 5.
The ACA, read as a whole, addresses the parties' entire existing and future
relationship. The Court finds that the language in Section 5 supports Lathi's interpretation,
which reflects the intent of the parties. The failure to mention the Disputed Projects in the
final portion of Section 5 makes sense if they were assumed to be included in the waterfall
per Schedule I. Clark's testimony disagrees, but there is no evidence that Schedule I was
intended only to list collateral to secure Lathi's debts. Additionally, the plain language of the
contract states otherwise. To adopt Clark's interpretation would ignore the combined effect of
the language in Recital "A", Schedule I, and Section 5. Additionally, the parties' prior conduct
comports with the Court's finding as to the intent of the parties with regard to this issue.
Thus, the Court finds that Section 5 should be read to apply to all SECP Entities, as listed on
Schedule I, including the Disputed Projects. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the
this issue is GRANTED, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

B. Definition of "New SEep Entities"
The parties also seek the Court's interpretation of the defined term "New SECP
Entities." Defendants argue Lathi's ownership in a sub-entity is required for it to be
considered a New SECP Entity subject to the waterfall distribution provision in the ACA.
Lathi, on the other hand, argues that his ownership in a sub-entity was not required, only his
involvement in the project, for the sub-entity to be a New SECP Entity subject to the waterfall.
The parties' disagreement involves the word "may" and what it modifies.
Recital "C", states, "It is contemplated that Lathi ... and Clark [including SECP] ... may
become shareholders, members or partners in one or more entities hereafter engaged in real
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estate ownership, development, management or leasing (collectively, the "New SECP
Entities" and individually, a "New SECP Entity")." (emphasis added).
The Court finds this language to be ambiguous. The communications leading up to
the ACA and the testimony of the parties after the ACA demonstrate that there is a distinction
between ownership interests in a sub-entity, which provide for the ability to deduct for losses
among other things, and profit participation. For example, the disputed language in Section
5, discussed above, states that the ownership interests of Lake Spivey, Creekside and
Northside would reflect a 99.99% ownership interest in Clark and a .01 % ownership interest
by Lathi, but that the profits would be distributed according to the waterfall (50% share of
profits after the waterfall priority payments). Additionally, in a July 20,2004 email, Clark
discussed his willingness to grant Lathi profit interests, but not ownership interests, in new
projects until Lathi's personal financial situation was rectified.
While the parties disagree about many points of their working relationship, it is clear
that the parties worked together on these projects for a moderate salary ($50,000) with the
intent to earn additional compensation from project proceeds. This is the only way that Lathi
could ever repay Clark/SECPIPC under the terms of the ACA. The waterfall provision was
structured to reapportion the risk between Clark and Lathi because Clark was fronting all of
the capital for these projects; thus, under the waterfall Clark was entitled to priority payments,
returns, and reimbursed guaranty fees before Lathi would ever receive his 50% share of the
remaining proceeds. In fact, subsection (viii) of Section 5, which provides for the 50/50 split
of remaining proceeds, states that "Lathi will have no ownership interests in the new
transactions, but such transactions will be set up as a contractual relationship." The Court
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finds that this language, read together with Recital "C", and the waterfall provisions comports
with Lathi's interpretation of the meaning of "New SECP Entities."
Finally, SECP was creating the sub-entities to develop the projects and rolling
expenses back into its account. Lathi was a 50% owner in SECP, but had limited ownership
interests, if any, in the development sub-entities. The arrangement for Lathi to participate in
the profits of "New" entities because of his ownership in SECP and his construction and
management work on the projects, is consistent with this Court's understanding of the parties'
complicated deal structures.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue is

GRANTED, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
C. Guaranty Fee Provisions
Defendants seek payment of certain guaranty fees from Lathi pursuant to the ACA.
Lahti concedes that the ACA provides a mechanism to compensate Clark for guaranty fees.
He argues, however, that the reimbursement mechanisms are paid solely through the
waterfall priority established therein and out of proceeds from the projects, not from Lathi
personally.
Recital "G" of the ACA reads that "Clark is a personal guarantor of various debts owed
by one or more of the Existing SECP Entities and the parties wish to make provision for the
payment by Lathi to Clark of guaranty fees in connection therewith and to provide security
for the payment thereof." (emphasis added). Additionally, Section 3 of the ACA states, "[f]rom
and after the date of this Agreement, Lathi shall pay a one-time guaranty fee (the "Guaranty
Fees") equal to the percentage of the amount of the Guaranty Liability incurred by Clark that
is attributable to the indebtedness set forth on Schedule III attached hereto ... Guaranty Fees
shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 .... " (emphasis added). Section 3
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addresses guaranty fees paid for existing SECP project loans and provides a mechanism for
calculating guaranty fees on future projects. Section 5, the waterfall provision discussed
above, describes the order in which Clark would be reimbursed for such guaranty fees.
In Recital "G", the ACA creates an obligation for Lathi to share in "Guaranty Liability"
by paying a guaranty fee to Clark. The language "one-time" must be read to limit Lathi's
liability for the fee itself to Clark, but not for any additional guarantor liability on the project
thereafter. The ACA is also clear that Lathi will not provide a personal guaranty for any new
deals in the future (see §§ 3, 5(v», and Section 3 is a mechanism to redistribute the guaranty
risks between Clark and Lathi. Under Section 5 of the ACA, however, if the guaranty fees
were to be paid solely by Lathi, then the guaranty fee should come out of his share after the
proceeds were split between Clark and Lathi. Instead, Section 5 provides that the guaranty
fee would come out of the proceeds before they were split by Clark and Lathi.
Because the Court cannot reconcile the inclusion of the guaranty fee within the
waterfall structure with the language acknowledging Lathi's liability to Clark for the fees (as
evidenced in Recital "G"), the Court reserves this question for the jury. Both Plaintiffs and
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are, therefore, DENIED on this issue.

IV. ISSUES RELATING TO THE ASA CANDLER MANSION

Section 1 of the ACA states "Lathi and Clark each hereby acknowledge and agree that
the Existing Lathi Indebtedness is due and owing by Lathi to Clark in the amount set forth on
Schedule II." Schedule II lists Lathi's debt under the CNB loan as $325,000 in principal and
$183,033 in interest (total of $508,033). Schedule II lists an additional amount of $502,095
as principal and $57,541 in interest under the heading "Loans by Southeast Capital Partners,
Inc.". Section 6(A)(vi) and Section 2 of the ACA modify the debt which the Asa Candler
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Mansion (the CNB loan security) secures to cover both the CNB loan and future SECP
Indebtedness. 1
The ACA clearly identifies the CNB loan amount as $325,000 plus interest (the "CNB
Loan Amount"), and lists the additional $502,000 amount as an SECP loan. Thus, the
security interest in the Asa Candler Mansion relates to the CNB Loan Amount and any debt
owed by Lathi to SECP pursuant to Section 2 of the ACA. The additional $502,000 SECP
loan amount was not secured by the Asa Candler Mansion according to the ASA.
Pursuant to Section 4(C) of the ACA, distributions owed to Lathi (but assigned under
the ACA) were to be made in the following priority: first to the CNB loan, second to Secured
Indebtedness owed to Clark, and third to Secured Indebtedness owed to SECP. Thus,
Lathi's Secured Indebtedness to SECP, which, according to the priority payment provisions
was the last debt to be paid, was secured by the Asa Candler Mansion. Section 6(B),
however, provides that "[i]n the event the Lake Toxaway house is sold by Lathi, ... then all
proceeds thereof, up to the amount of the balance of the CNB Loan plus the current
outstanding balance of the Secured Indebtedness due Employer [SECP] under Section 2,
shall be applied against the Secured Indebtedness." Thus, Section 6(B) alters the payment
priority scheme outlined in Section 4(C) and allows the Section 2 SECP Indebtedness to be
repaid out of turn if the Lake Toxaway house was sold.
Plaintiffs relied upon the statements and documents of Mr. Hughes, SECP's
accountant, to establish that Lathi paid in full the CNB Loan Amount. This evidence has not
been contradicted by Defendants. Additionally, Lahti presented evidence that he sold the
I Section 6(A)(vi) of the ACA, which discusses the CNB loan, requires that the CNB security documentation
"shall be amended to ... modify the indebtedness evidenced and secured thereby to include the portion of the
Secured Indebtedness due and owning under Section 2 of this Agreement. .. " Section 2 of the ACA lists a
$22,000 payment to Regions Bank on Lathi's behalf and any future salary draws by Lathi from SECP as debt
owed to SECP.
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Lake Toxaway house and applied the proceeds to the Existing Indebtedness. Thus, the debt
to which the CNS security (the Asa Candler Mansion) attached has been extinguished.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants' claims regarding the transfer, priority, and
security interests regarding Counterclaim Defendants Subhash Lathi and SunTrust are moot.
For this reason the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. and
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Counterclaim Defendant Subhash Lathi are
hereby GRANTED.

V. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
A. Due Diligence Costs
Lathi seeks summary judgment on Count 6 of Defendants' counterclaim to recoup the
costs of certain investigative and due diligence work, the cost of which was incurred by SEC
Development Inc. ("SEC Development") allegedly after Lathi's termination and at his
direction. Clark testified that Lathi orally agreed to reimburse SEC Development for such
costs. Defendants seek recovery of these costs under a theory of unjust enrichment.
Lathi seeks summary judgment on the grounds that such a promise is an oral
promise to "answer for the debt. .. of another" in violation of the statute of frauds. See
O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30(2). The statute of frauds, however, does not require that an original
undertaking be in writing. See Lindsey v. Heard Oil Co., 170 Ga. App. 572, 574 (1984)
(affirming recovery against a shareholder who promised its creditor to pay any bills incurred
by his lumber company because it was an original undertaking not barred by the statute of
frauds). Here, Clark testified that SEC Development incurred the expenses in reliance upon
Lathi's promise to pay the expenses. As such, it may constitute an original undertaking not
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barred by the statute of frauds. Lathi's Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue is
therefore DENIED.

B. Quantum Meruit
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims in quantum merit to recover
for unpaid work performed on the disputed projects. Defendants argue that the specific
agreements (independent contractor's agreement, ACA, etc.) entered into between Clark/P.
Clark/SECP and Lathi governed the parties' conduct and relationships, thus preventing
recovery in quantum meruit. See Choate Constr. Co., Inc.

V.

Ideal Electric. Contractors, Inc.,

246 Ga. App. 626 (2000). In light of the Court's earlier ruling on the scope of the ACA and
the evidence in the record of the parties existing contracts covering ownership interests and
employment rights, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue is GRANTED.

C. Stock Redemption
Defendants seek summary judgment on their claims relating to Plaintiff's refusal to
honor SECP's stock redemption rights as found in § 2(a}(ii) and (iii) of the SECP Shareholder
Agreement ("SECP SH Agreement"). Under the SECP SH Agreement, SECP has the right to
redeem stock upon the occurrence of a terminating event, which includes the termination of
employment for any reason. On January 16, 2006, Clark and Lathi discussed Lathi's
termination with SECP. Lathi claims that he was terminated on that day. Clark, however,
provided affidavit testimony that Lathi was not terminated until he received the January 24th
letter, which cited Lathi's solicitation of SECP employees. The letter, however, references
the January 16th "termination" and includes the phrase "effective immediately." On February
27,2006, SECP sent Lathi a letter notifying him of its election to redeem its stock.
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Defendants seek the equitable remedy of specific performance to enforce the stock
redemption rights. Lathi, however, argues that his employment termination was effective on
January 16, 2006, not on January 24th. Thus, Lathi argues, the February 2ih letter was
untimely and ineffective to redeem the stock.
Second, Lathi contends that Clark, as SECP's President and his co-owner, did not
have the unilateral authority to fire an SECP officer. Under D.C.G.A. § 9-14-841, a
corporation's president has the authority to "conduct all ordinary business on behalf of such
corporation." Under most circumstances the decision to terminate an at-will employee would
fall under the broad reach of "ordinary business." Here, the decision to terminate Lathi's
employment with SECP resulted in his automatic withdrawal from SECP as an owner. In light
of Lathi's 50% ownership interest in and position as co-director of SECP, the Court finds that
whether the decision to terminate Lathi was in SECP "ordinary business" raises a question of
fact and should be determined by a jury. If the termination decision is within the "ordinary
business" of SECP, then the jury must determine if the redemption notice was timely based
upon Lathi's date of termination, which is another question of fact for the jury.
Because the determination of this issue involves jury questions, the Court hereby
DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on this count.
D. Co-Guarantor Contributions
Defendants seek contribution from Lathi, who signed as a co-guarantor on the Lake
Spivey and Northside guarantees, pursuant to D.C.G.A. § 10-7-50. Lathi objects to summary
judgment at this stage on the grounds that Clark has failed to prove that his payments
thereunder were compulsory. Additionally, Lathi argues that some of the guaranty expenses
were paid by P. Clark, who was not a party to the guaranty, and are not recoverable against
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him. See Carter v. Parrish, 274 Ga. App. 97 (2005) (holding that two shareholders were not
entitled to contribution pursuant to D.C.G.A. § 23-2-71 from their other shareholders for their
respective share of a settlement where the settlement was paid by a third party).
Defendants submitted the affidavits of Clark and SECP accountant Hugh Nelson to
support their claim for contribution on the guaranty obligation for approximately $1.6M (Lathi's
share) paid on the Lake Spivey and Northside guarantees. While Lathi requests that
Defendants prove these contribution payments through cancelled checks or other evidence,
Defendants contend that the best evidence rule does not apply to this situation. See Brewer
v. Brewer, 249 Ga. 517 (1982) ("Here, it is ... the fact of payment of an obligation or other
disbursement of funds ... may be proved by oral testimony.").
Relying upon discovery documents, Plaintiff also argues that the guaranty payments
by Clark were actually "loans" that Clark made to the developments and not guaranty
payments. Because questions of fact remain regarding the amount and terms of payments
made by Clark for which Lathi could be held liable for contribution, the Court DENIES
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue.

E. MTB Account
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims relating to funds held in a
MTB account pursuant to the ACA. The record is clear that the funds were used in a manner
agreed to by Lathi in order to satisfy his federal tax obligations and an outstanding balance
with the escrow agent.
The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to the
MTB account.
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F. Service Intensive Distributions
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims regarding Service-Intensive
Distributions per paragraph 5.5 of the Operating Agreements for Brookwood, Borghese and
Museum Towers. The Service-Intensive Distributions are to be given at the "sole discretion"
of the members. Service-Intensive Distributions are defined as amounts "determined by the
managers acting reasonably and in good faith, as being extraordinarily attributable to
services provided by the Members." While Lathi may have received such bonuses in the past
or anticipated receiving them on these other projects, the contracts in question do not provide
him with a positive right or entitlement to these fees. Additionally, Lahti failed to produce
sufficient facts, with regard to these distributions, to raise a factual question on Clark's
alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith. Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment on these claims.

G. Alter Ego Liability
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims relating to alter ego liability
(piercing SECP and/or holding that Clark and P. Clark acted as one and same). Defendants
have submitted uncontroverted evidence that SECP's corporate form (and that of its entities)
is respected and that funds are not comingled between Clark, SECP, the SECP entities, and
P. Clark. Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence supporting his allegations of alter ego
liability. See Amason v. Whitehead, 186 Ga. App. 320, 320 (1988) (affirming trial court's
grant of summary judgment on veil piercing claims where there was no evidence of ignoring
the corporate form, commingling assets, or fraud). The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment on this claim.
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H. C-Corp Relief
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims seeking recovery under
Georgia's C-Corp codes on the grounds that SECP is not a C-Corporation and thus ineligible
for any rights or remedies provided under the relevant statutes. Qualifying as a C-Corp
requires a specific statutory election, which SECP did not make. Equitable remedies sought
by lathi, however, are not extinguished. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

SO ORDERED this

l(P

day of April, 2008.

ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Copies to:
Ezra B. Jones III, Esq.
PENDERGAST & JONES P.C.
115 Perimeter Center Place
Atlanta, GA 30346
J. Scott Jacobson, Esq.
Scott E. Morris, Esq.
HOLT NEY ZATCOFF & WASSERMAN, llP
100 Galleria Parkway, Suite 600
Atlanta, GA 30339
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